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It has been long known that the human right
hemisphere makes special contributions to the
analysis of the emotional significance of facial
expressions. Recent studies of brain damaged patients
now show more precisely where and how the right
hemisphere goes about doing so.
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In the late 1800s, Jackson Hughlings [1] noted that the
halting speech characteristic of aphasia that accompanied
left hemisphere lesions was curiously attenuated when
patients’ vocalizations were laced with emotional vigor.
This surprising spared fluency for offensive language is at
once an amusing neurological anecdote as well as a land-
mark finding in human ‘affective neuroscience’ — the
study of the neural basis of emotions. It provided early
evidence that affective and cognitive operations may rep-
resent functionally dissociable entities, subserved by par-
tially distinct neural systems in the human brain.
Moreover, it demonstrated that the human cerebral hemi-
spheres were not just divided by the lateral fissure, but
also by the types of computation they are specialized to
perform — with the right hemisphere appearing to differ-
entially support communicative gestures or acts colored
with emotional significance. Recent findings from patients
with impaired abilities to evaluate emotional states from
facial expressions have led to a more complete under-
standing of the right hemisphere’s contribution to emo-
tional processing, providing new insights into the neural
basis of our larger emotional competence.
The great degree of correspondence between emotional
processing deficits and lesions of right hemisphere origin
have led to the ‘right hemisphere dominance’ theory of
emotional processing [2,3], in which the right hemisphere
is considered to be differentially involved in both the
display [2] and evaluation [3] of emotional expressions.
Despite the substantial consistency of the evidence sup-
porting the view that the right hemisphere plays a domi-
nant role in emotional processing, the apparent lack of
intrahemispheric localization suggests that the entire
right hemisphere may play an equally important part in
emotional processing. In this respect, in this age of
greater neuroanatomic specificity, the right hemisphere
dominance theory of the neural substrates of emotional
communication is somewhat unsatisfactory. This now
appears to be changing. One source of this lack of speci-
ficity is that neuropsychological studies, by necessity,
often collapse across lesions varying widely in extent and
location. Given the rarity of group studies of patients with
selective and homogenous lesions, the non-specifity of
the right hemisphere dominance hypothesis is likely to
be a product of this macroscopic level of analysis. 
This state of affairs has been clarified by Adolphs et al.’s
[4] recent comprehensive study of impairments in the
evaluation of facial emotion in 108 patients with lesions
varying widely in extent within each hemisphere (63 with
lesions of the right and 60 with lesions of the left hemi-
sphere, and 15 with bilateral lesions). When the lesions
were analyzed as a function of task performance coregis-
tered in a common brain space, joint volumetric lesion
density indicated areas of damage most associated with
facial emotion recognition impairment. This three-dimen-
sional Venn diagram in brain space revealed a significant
association between impairment and lesions within the
right hemisphere. But the analysis went further than this:
when the overlap was considered in patients with right
hemisphere lesions that exhibited particular difficulty in
comprehending the emotional significance of facial
expressions, a ‘hot spot’ within somatosensory-related cor-
tices was revealed, consisting specifically of the
somatosensory cortices, S-I and S-II, the anterior supra-
marginal gyrus and the insular cortex (Figure 1). Lesions
of these regions were often accompanied by more diffuse
damage; critically, individual patients with more selective
damage restricted to somatosensory cortices also exhib-
ited robust impairments. Follow-up analyses demon-
strated that these impairments were correlated with
tactile, but not motor deficits, suggesting the critical locus
of damage was confined to the postcentral gyrus.
It may be surprising to find that a deficit in visual recog-
nition of a specific object class is dependent on the
integrity of somatosensory cortices, but this is consistent
with the notion that impairments in the recognition of
facial emotion are independent of the analysis of non-
emotional facial dimensions [5], and likely reflect a more
fundamental deficit in emotional representation. These
results dovetail nicely with the ‘somatic-marker’ hypoth-
esis [6], which asserts that somatosensory representations
are an essential component of the generation of phenom-
enal affective states. The evaluation of facial displays of
emotion may involve a recoding of visual input in the
somatosensory cortex, in such a way that the observer is
able to represent facial configurations parsed in the
visual association areas in terms of ‘affective space’,
overtly or covertly representing the actual feeling of the
expressed emotion. This is consistent with other evi-
dence that the viewing of facial displays is often accom-
panied by a form of emotional ‘resonance’ in the
perceiver — invisible mimicry in the viewer’s facial mus-
culature [7]. Contemporary facial-feedback theories of
emotional states, stemming from work of the philosopher
William James early this century, assert that facial
expressions are causally related to emotional experience,
suggesting that experiential states may be the result of
the feedback from such invisible emotion-specific
muscle patterning in the face [8]. The evaluation of
facial expressions may, then, critically depend upon a
somatomotor decomposition of their appearance and the
resulting affective resonance in the perceiver. 
Accordingly, the recent findings of Adolphs et al. [4] not
only provide a significant refinement of the intrahemi-
spheric localization of facial emotion recognition within
the right hemisphere, but also provide a more fundamen-
tal understanding of the right hemisphere’s particular con-
tributions. Specifically, the dependence of the visual
recognition of affective signals upon right hemisphere
somatosensory cortices demonstrates that the appreciation
of facial expressions is not merely a reflection of a categor-
ical specialization within the ventral object processing
stream, or of some global/configural visual processing
advantage associated with the right hemisphere. Rather,
this right hemisphere specialization for evaluating affec-
tive facial content appears to reflect our ability to map the
portrayed expression directly onto one’s internal repre-
sentation of the corresponding emotional state. This has
more than a superficial similarity to the motor theory of
speech perception [9]. The motor theory suggests the
comprehension of distal speech signals is intimately
related to the proximal activation in the perceiver of
motor gestures typically recruited in the speech act. Evo-
lution has likely employed variations on a common solu-
tion for different forms of social communication, applying
a similar algorithm to the even more abstract capacity to
represent the internal mental states of others. 
The findings of Adolphs et al. [4] also raise many
questions, however. There are two sources of evidence in
particular that may be at odds with this somatosensory
account of emotion recognition: first is the evidence for
dissociations between different affective communicative
channels; and second, in contrast to the results reported by
Adolphs et al. [4], other findings demonstrate significant
emotion-specificity of impairment. 
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Figure 1 
(a) Analysis of the overlap of lesions from 108
patients in relation to their performance on a
task involving the recognition of the emotional
significance of facial expressions. Red regions
correspond to locations most associated with
impairment. The central sulcus is indicated in
green. This analysis [4] revealed that right
hemisphere somatosensory-related cortices
were most associated with impaired
recognition of facial emotion. In the lower
panel, statistical significance is indicated for
each of the white voxels on the coronal
sections. (b) Individual patients with lesions
selective for right hemisphere somatosensory
cortices demonstrate significant impairment in
comprehending facial emotion. In contrast,
more anterior lesions largely sparing somato-
sensory cortices leave such functions intact.
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What we refer to as emotion is a constellation of sundry
functions. These include subjective experience as well as
its evaluation and expression via prosodic, gestural and
lexical communicative channels. If lesions of the right
hemisphere somatosensory cortex represent a more fun-
damental deficit in emotional competence, then we
would expect such impairments should extend to all the
various functions associated with emotional processing.
This would to some extent be in contrast with our
current understanding of how emotional communication
is supported in the brain. For example, it has been shown
that healthy adults exhibit correlations between recep-
tive channels — that is, there is significant correspon-
dence in proficiency in evaluating emotional state from
facial, vocal or lexical sources within a normal individual
— but these abilities become decoupled in patients with
non-specific right hemisphere damage, with patients
showing selective deficits for a particular channel [10].
We [11] have also shown dissociations between the
recognition of emotion from vocal and facial sources fol-
lowing amygdala damage. More recently, we [12] have
shown that, despite severely impaired recognition of
facial expressions of fear associated with amygdala
lesions, the ability to express fear with one’s own face
remains intact. Do such dissociations between different
affective channels and between the comprehension and
production of affective signals pose a problem for the
affective resonance theory of emotion recognition? 
Furthermore, the deficits associated with lesions of
somatosensory-related cortices do not correspond to any
one emotion type, but rather result in a global impairment
in the evaluation of emotion from the face. Human
emotion has been conceptualized as dependent on punc-
tate ‘basic’ emotions, with independent representations
for a restricted set of primary affects, such as fear, anger,
happiness and so on [13]. Consonant with this view, recent
studies have demonstrated significant emotion-specificity
of neural representations, with subcortical structures, such
as the amygdala, supporting the analysis of fear [14], and
cortical structures, such as the anterior insular region, sup-
porting the analysis of disgust [15]. How does the view
that the right hemisphere somatosensory cortices have a
global role in emotion processing tally with this evidence
for emotion-specificity of neural representations?
These contrasting results do not necessarily provide
incompatible views of emotional organization in the
brain, but likely reflect a complementary representa-
tional framework. The somatosensory-related cortices
may be an affective convergence zone [16] — the sender
and recipient of information from right hemisphere
modules that represent multiple, functionally distinct
affective maps at different levels of organization. For
example, at one end of the structure–function spectrum,
there may exist individuated neural representations for
discrete emotion types — such as fear, happiness and so
on — for different input–output modalities, and at higher
levels of organization there may be amodal representa-
tions that are not specific to any particular emotion type.
These non-specific representations may be supported by
the right hemisphere somatosensory-related cortices.
There is some evidence to suggest the brain uses an
affective representational scheme of this kind. 
My colleagues and I [17] have recently found that the right
hemisphere dominance for the evaluation of facial emotion,
typically ascribed to cortical function, extends to subcorti-
cal structures as well, with right but not left hemisphere
lesions of the amygdala resulting in the impaired evalua-
tion of fearful facial expressions. Significantly, when
damage extends beyond the amygdala to adjacent struc-
tures within the anteromedial lobe, what results is a more
global impairment in the evaluation of emotions related to
action tendencies of withdrawalavoidance. This suggests
there may be a systematic organization within the right
hemisphere in which different basic emotions are sup-
ported by discrete neural substrates, as in the case of the
amygdala and fear, as well as an intermediate level of orga-
nization in which emotions aligning with a particular affec-
tive axis, such as the approach–avoidance response, occupy
adjacent regions in neuroanatomical space. At the top of
this affective hierarchy might sit the putative right hemi-
sphere somatosensory convergence zone. 
The true test of this hypothesis would be to show that only
lesions encroaching upon right hemisphere somatosensory-
related cortices result in high-level emotional functioning
deficits, irrespective of input modality and output expres-
sion. If this prediction is borne out, neural representations
seated within the right hemisphere somatosensory cortices
would likely be responsible for the observed correlations
among affective information-processing abilities in healthy
adults. This brain region might be responsible for the
elusive notion of our underlying emotional competence or
‘emotional intelligence’ [18], postulated to promote
sensitivity to the evaluation of one’s own internal affective
states as well as those portrayed by others. Deficits in the
evaluation of facial expressions following somatosensory-
related cortical damage would then be only symptomatic of
a more fundamental deficit in emotional representation.
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